PLUGGING THE “PHISHING” HOLE:
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ABSTRACT
This iBrief analyzes the Anti-Phishing Act of 2005, legislation
aimed at curbing the problem of “phishing.” Phishing is the
sending of fraudulent emails which appear to be from legitimate
businesses and thereby fooling the recipients into divulging
personal information such as credit card numbers. While this
legislation may provide some assistance in the fight against
phishing, it is limited by the global nature of the Internet and the
ease with which phishers can hide and avoid judgments. This
iBrief therefore concludes that although the Anti-Phishing Act can
play a supporting role in the battle, technological solutions are the
most effective means of reducing or eliminating phishing attacks.

INTRODUCTION
The Internet has created a marketplace for businesses and
consumers to come together and interact in new and exciting ways.
Unfortunately, it has also provided criminals and the unscrupulous with a
new venue.2 Nowhere is this more evident than in the recent emergence and
growth of the phenomenon known as “phishing.” The United States
Department of Justice defines phishing as
¶1

criminals’ creation and use of e-mails and websites—designed to look
like e-mails and websites of well-known legitimate businesses,
financial institutions, and government agencies—in order to deceive
Internet users into disclosing their bank and financial account
information or other personal data such as usernames and passwords.3
1

Robert Stevenson is a third year student at Duke University School of Law.
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2
See e.g., House of Representatives Government Reform Committee,
Technology, Information Policy, Intergovernmental Relations and the Census
Committee Hearing, 108th Cong. 35-36 (2004), [hereinafter House Committee
Hearing] (Testimony of Bill Conner, Chairman, President and CEO of Entrust,
Inc. stating that “[j]ust as the Internet has supercharged commercial transactions,
it has also supercharged cybercrime.”) available at 2004 WL 2137978.
3
United States Dept. of Justice, Special Report on “Phishing,” p. 3 (2004)
[hereinafter DOJ Report], available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/Phishing.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2004).
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Studies indicate that the number of phishing incidents is increasing
at an alarming rate. A recent report by the Anti-Phishing Working Group4
(“APWG”) found that phishing attacks have increased by an average of
30% each month since July 2004.5 In January 2005, alone, more than
12,800 phishing emails and 2,560 phishing web sites, representing 64
hijacked brands, were reported and tracked by the APWG.6 Perhaps the
rapid growth of this new type of consumer fraud can be explained by the
additional finding by the APWG that “data suggests that phishers are able to
convince up to 5% of recipients to respond to them.”7 By contrast, the
estimated response rate for regular spam is 0.01%.8 Further research has
estimated that the costs of these phishing attacks on consumers in 2003
ranged from $500 million to an amazing $2.4 billion.9
¶2

For other definitions of “phishing,” see also The Anti-Phishing Working Group,
Proposed Solutions to Address the Threat of Email Spoofing Scams, Dec. 12,
2003 [hereinafter APWG Whitepaper] (“Phishing is the creation of email
messages and web pages that are replicas of existing sites to fool users into
submitting personal, financial, or password data.”) available at
http://www.antiphishing.org/Proposed%20Solutions%20to%20Address%20the
%20Threat%20of%20Email%20Spoofing%20Scams%20White%20Paper.pdf
(last visited Oct. 19, 2004); and Financial Services Technology Consortium,
Project Proposal: FSTC Counter-Phishing Initiative, 2004, p. 2 [hereinafter
FSTC Proposal] (“’phishing’ refers to the activities of criminals who imitate
legitimate companies’ e-mails, web sites, and phone calls or other
communications to entice account holders to share highly sensitive personal data
such as SSNs, usernames and passwords, and/or account numbers. Once
acquired, perpetrators leverage the stolen authenticators to commit a myriad of
subsequent crimes.”) available at
http://fstc.org/projects/FSTC_Phishing_Prospectus_Final.pdf (last visited Oct.
19, 2004).
4
“The Anti Phishing Working Group (APWG) is an industry association
focused on eliminating the identity theft and fraud that result from the growing
problem of phishing and email spoofing…There are currently over 706
organizations participating in the APWG.” Anti-Phishing Working Group,
Phishing Activity Trends Report, January, 2005, [hereinafter APWG Report]
available at http://antiphishing.org/APWG_Phishing_Activity_ReportJanuary2005.pdf (last visited March 6, 2005). The website for the APWG is
http://www.antiphishing.org/.
5
APWG Report, supra note 4.
6
Id.
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Id.
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Laura Sullivan, California; Internet ‘Phishing’ Scams on the Rise, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 22, 2004, p. C2.
9
Good news: 'Phishing' scams net only $500 million , CNET NEWS.COM, Sept.
29, 2004 (article summarizes studies from Truste, Inc. and Gartner, Inc.)
available at
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Phishing is a particularly invidious attack on the Internet
community because it almost always involves two separate acts of fraud.
The phisher first “steals” the identity of the business it is impersonating and
then acquires the personal information of the unwitting customers who fall
for the impersonation. This has led commentators to refer to phishing as a
“two-fold scam”10 and a “cybercrime double play.”11
¶3

¶4
It is clear that something must be done soon to curb this alarming
trend. The question, however, is what can and should be done to reduce or
even eliminate phishing attacks.
¶5
On February 28, 2005, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) introduced
the Anti-Phishing Act of 2005 (“the Act”) in the United States Senate.12
The Act is virtually identical to the Anti-Phishing Act of 2004, which
Senator Leahy introduced last year but stalled in committee without coming
to a vote before the congressional session ended.13 This iBrief provides an
analysis of the Act and concludes that this bill would fill some gaps in the
current law and would make prosecution and conviction of phishers easier.
However, the Act suffers from the same inherent weaknesses as all
legislation aimed at solving what is essentially a technological problem.
Although Congress should enact this legislation, alone it is unlikely to truly
stop the flow of phishing attacks. The only way to effectively eliminate the
phishing problem is to focus on technological changes and have legislation
play a supporting role.

I. THE ANTI-PHISHING ACT OF 2005
A. Content of the Act
¶6

The Act, if passed, will add two crimes to the current federal law:
1. It would criminalize the act of sending a
phishing email regardless of whether any
recipients of the email suffered any actual
damages.14
2. It would criminalize the act of creating a
phishing website regardless of whether any

http://news.com.com/Good+news+Phishing+scams+net+ionlyi+500+million/21
00-1029_3-5388757.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2004).
10
Harry A. Valetk, Mastering the Dark Arts of Cyberspace: A Quest for Sound
Internet Safety Policies, 2004 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 2, 12 (2004).
11
Thomas Fedorek, Computers + Connectivity = New Opportunities for
Criminals and Dilemmas for Investigators, 76-FEB N.Y. ST. B.J. 10, 16 (2004).
12
S. 472, 109th Cong. (2005).
13
S. 2636, 108th Cong. (2004).
14
S. 472 at § 1351(b).
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visitors to the website suffered any actual
damages.15
¶7

Senator Leahy described the effects of the Act in this way:
The [Act] protects the integrity of the Internet in two ways. First, it
criminalizes the bait. It makes it illegal to knowingly send out spoofed
email that links to sham websites, with the intention of committing a
crime. Second, it criminalizes the sham websites that are the true
scene of the crime.16

¶8
The Act is also notable for what it does not contain. The bill
provides no guidance or allocation of additional resources for its
enforcement. This is in contrast with a recently proposed bill in the House
of Representatives17 aimed primarily at “spyware.”18 While the House bill
adds no law related to phishing, it does provide for the appropriation of “the
sum of $10,000,000 to the Attorney General for prosecutions needed to
discourage the use of spyware and . . . phishing.”19 Because the House bill
adds no new law directed at phishing,20 this iBrief does not further discuss
or analyze it. It is noted here only for the purpose of pointing out a possible
deficiency in the Act.

15

Id. at § 1351(a).
150 CONG. REC. S7897-02 (daily ed. July 9, 2004) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
This statement was in support of the 2004 version of the Act. Because the 2005
Act is virtually identical to the 2004 version, statements supporting, analyzing,
or criticizing one version are assumed to apply to the other version, as well.
17
Internet Spyware (I-SPY) Prevention Act of 2005, H.R. 744, 109th Cong. (1st
Sess. 2005). This act is virtually identical to one that was submitted in the
previous Congressional session but did not reach a vote. That act was the
Internet Spyware (I-SPY) Prevention Act of 2004, H.R. 4661, 108th Cong. (2d
Sess. 2004).
18
“Spyware” is “software that ‘aids in gathering information about a person or
organization without their knowledge and which may send such information to
another entity without the consumer’s consent, or asserts control over a
computer without the consumer’s knowledge.’” H.R. REP NO. 108-698, at 3,
(2004) (Report quotes from the Federal Trade Commission’s definition of
spyware available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/spyware/).
19
H.R. 744, Sec. 3, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005).
20
There is some indication from the Report accompanying H.R. 4661 that its
sponsors did not feel that any additional law specifically addressed to phishing is
necessary since they write that “the [phishing] schemes themselves, and the uses
of the information by the criminals who obtain it are not unique to the Internet,
and almost all are illegal under existing Federal criminal laws dealing with wire
fraud.” H.R. REP NO. 108-698, at 4 (2004).
16

2005

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. 5

B. History and Status of the Act
¶9
There is little information indicating how the Act came into being.
Senator Leahy, himself, at the time he introduced the 2004 version of the
bill said only that “we have worked closely with various public interest
organizations to ensure that the Anti-Phishing Act does not impinge on the
important democratic role that the Internet plays.”21 For instance, Senator
Leahy has attempted to address First Amendment concerns that some
groups may have had regarding certain provisions within the bill since
Senator Leahy also stated when he introduced the bill, “[t]here are
important First Amendment concerns to be protected. The Anti-Phishing
Act protects parodies and political speech from being prosecuted as
Phishing.”22
¶10
Beyond the congressional record, there is some indication that the
Act had the support of some influential Internet entities including the AntiPhishing Working Group, the Center for Democracy and Technology, and
eBay.23

C. Analysis
1. Where the Act helps
¶11
The main area in which the Act will likely help in the current fight
against phishing attacks is in allowing the prosecution of phishers without
requiring a showing of specific damages to any individual. As explained by
a member of Senator Leahy’s staff:
[p]hishing scammers already violate a host of identity theft and fraud
laws, but prosecuting them under those statutes can be challenging . . .
. To charge scammers now, law enforcers need to prove that a victim
suffered measurable losses. By the time they do that . . . the scammer
has often disappeared.24
¶12
This reasoning is bolstered by data compiled by the APWG finding
that the average life span for phishing sites, measured by how long they
continue to respond with content, is 5.8 days.25 Accordingly, law
enforcement personnel have, on average, 5.8 days from the time the phisher

21

150 CONG. REC. S7897-02 at S7898 (daily ed. July 9, 2004) (statement of Sen.
Leahy).
22
Id. at S7897.
23
Winter Casey, Lawmakers File Tech Bills To Spur Economic Growth,
TECHNOLOGY DAILY PM, July 9, 2004, available at 2004 WL 74915988.
24
David McGuire, Senate Bill Targets ‘Phishers’, Newsbytes News Network,
Jul. 12, 2004, available at 2004 WL 55866572.
25
APWG Report, supra note 4.
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first initiates the scam to track him or her down and compile sufficient
evidence to bring charges.26
¶13
Additionally, removing the requirement to show damages permits
businesses to more easily come forward as the prime complainant against a
phisher that has “stolen” their web identity to scam their clients. Recall that
a phishing attack involves two victims, the business and the consumer.27
While the consumer’s economic damages are usually fairly obvious, the
reputational damages that a business incurs as the result of a phishing scam
are often much more difficult to quantify.28

2. Where the Act falls short
¶14
Any legislation aimed at punishing Internet-related offenses faces
three formidable hurdles: (1) difficulty inherent in finding the perpetrator of
an on-line crime, (2) obtaining personal jurisdiction, and (3) collecting the
judgment. Unless these can be overcome, the net impact of bills such as the
Anti-Phishing Act will be limited, at best.
¶15
The first problem, finding the perpetrator, is illustrated by two
related phishing incidents at the University of Michigan and Duke
University. In the fall of 2002, the University of Michigan hosted a
conference of the Palestinian Solidarity Movement (“PSM”). Shortly
before the conference was to begin, an email was sent to “a large number of
[the university’s] faculty, staff, and students”29 purporting to be sent by a
member of a student organization involved with the conference and with the
approval and assistance of university administration.30 The email, which
was not in fact authorized by anyone connected with the conference or the

26

This is, of course, assuming that an actual person can be traced even if a
particular phishing website remains “live.” For a more in-depth discussion of
the difficulties of tracking down Internet scammers and holding them legally
accountable for their actions, see Michael Rustad, Punitive Damages in
Cyberspace: Where in the World is the Consumer?, 7 CHAP. L. REV. 39 (Spring
2004).
27
See e.g. Kathy M. Kristof, Avoid Letting Yourself Get Hooked by an Internet
‘Phishing’ Expedition, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Feb. 1, 2004, C3 available at 2004
WL 55890852. (referring to phishing as a “two-tiered scam”).
28
See e.g. Karen Greenstein, Defending Your Brand from Email Spoofs—
Powerpoint Slides, 784 PLI/Pat 271, at 279-80 (Apr. 2004) (listing the harms to
a business caused by a phishing attack as (i) harm to reputation, (ii) impairment
of legitimate communication, (iii) strain on the customer service department,
and (iv) strain on the servers).
29
Paul Courant, Provost’s Statement on Fraudulent (“Spoofed”) E-Mail, Oct. 3,
2002 [hereinafter Second Courant Message], available at
http://www.umich.edu/courant2.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2004).
30
Id.
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university,31 contained “many misstatements of fact”32 and “violated norms
of civility and respect.”33 Despite “pursuing a vigorous investigation”34 into
the source of the offending email that included the services of “campus
information technology security experts”35 the investigators were only able
to conclude was that “the message originated in California.”36
¶16
A university administrator in charge of the investigation explained
the inability to track down the sender of the unauthorized email more
precisely:

It is important to recognize that when e-mail is sent from one point on
the Internet to another, it can follow a complex path as it travels
through multiple mail servers. In this case, the senders used an
unsecured server known as an "open relay" in order to help hide their
identity. Despite the best efforts of the investigating team, it is possible
we may not be able to determine who really sent the messages.37
¶17
Two years after this event, an almost identical incident occurred at
Duke University shortly before Duke hosted a PSM conference.38 As of
yet, investigators at Duke attempting to track down the source of the
unauthorized e-mail were again only able to “determine that it originated in
California.”39

These incidents highlight one of the biggest roadblocks that any
legislation in this area faces—finding the perpetrators. In order to punish
phishers for their fraudulent actions, one must first locate them. Yet, the
current state of Internet technology makes this extremely difficult. In a
recent report to Congress by the Federal Trade Commission concerning the
spam problem—the findings of which could apply equally as well to
phishing—the situation was explained in this way:
¶18

31

Id.
Paul Courant, Interim Provost Paul Courant’s Message to Campus Regarding
Violation of E-Mail Policy, Sep. 26, 2002 [hereinafter First Courant Message],
available at http://www.umich.edu/courant.html (last visited Oct, 21, 2004).
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Second Courant Message, supra note 29.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Email from John F. Burness, Senior Vice President for Public Affairs and
Government Relations, Duke University, to Members of the Duke Campus
Community (Oct. 13, 2004, 15:24:00 EDT), available at
http://www.dukenews.duke.edu/psm/bogusmessage.html (last visited Oct. 21,
2004).
39
Id.
32
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The single greatest challenge for anti-spam law enforcement is to
identify and locate the source of a particular spam campaign. Finding
the wrongdoer is an important aspect of all law enforcement efforts,
but in spam cases it is a particularly daunting task. Because the
present email system lacks any mechanism requiring that a sender’s
identity be authenticated, spammers can and do conceal their identities
with ease.40

Put another way,
[the] Internet allows anonymous communications that are virtually
impossible to trace through Internet nodes. Cyber-tortfeasors
frequently use false e-mail headers and anonymous remailers to make
it difficult to retrace the steps of wrongdoing. Computer records are
easy to alter and it is likely that spoliation of electronic evidence is
widespread.41

No threats of legal action can ever hope to effectively reduce the growing
phishing problem until there is some way of finding the phishers.
¶19
The second hurdle, obtaining jurisdiction over the phisher, stems
from the fact that “[c]ybercrime has always been a cross-border
enterprise.”42 Even if the perpetrator can be located, it is very possible that
the person is located in a foreign country outside of the legislation’s
jurisdictional reach. Indeed, “[c]ountries where cybercrime flourishes tend
to have weak laws dealing with computer crime, law enforcement agencies
that lack computer forensic capabilities and an underdeveloped apparatus
for collaborating with law enforcement agencies in other countries.”43
¶20
In fact, the APWG found that as of January 2005, only 32% of
phishing web sites were located in the United States.44 The three countries
hosting the next largest percentage of phishing sites were China, South
Korea and Japan.45 Clearly, jurisdictional issues are a major hurdle in
applying U.S.-based legislation to foreign phishing scheme perpetrators.

40

FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, A CAN-SPAM INFORMANT REWARD SYSTEM: A
REPORT TO CONGRESS at 10 (Sep. 2004) (footnotes omitted), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/rewardsys/040916rewardsysrpt.pdf (last visited Oct.
21, 2004).
41
Rustad, supra note 26, at 66.
42
Fedorek, supra note 11, at 17.
43
Id.
44
APWG Report, supra note 4.
45
Id.
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The third problem is that even if the first two hurdles are overcome
the perpetrator will very often be found to be “judgment proof.”46 This
phenomenon is explained as follows:
¶21

Even when a prevailing plaintiff wins a large punitive damages award,
collecting it is a different matter. Collecting a punitive damages award
is difficult because a number of wily Internet mice either fail to make
an appearance, file bankruptcy, or simply disappear after the plaintiff
obtains a judgment. Default judgments outnumbered cases decided by
juries in the larger cybertort dataset. . . . The large number of default
judgments in cyberlaw reflects the reality that it is easy for web sites to
disappear or assets to be transferred.47
¶22
The Federal Trade Commission’s own experience in attempting to
enforce judgments against Internet scammers illustrates the problem:

Indeed, the most egregious spammers, like other fraud operators, are
likely to transfer assets offshore to place them beyond the reach of
U.S. courts. . . . In the FTC’s experience, attempting to reach the
defendants’ offshore funds necessitates a foreign action to enforce a
U.S. court judgment. This is time-consuming, expensive, and, in many
cases, futile, as many countries do not enforce U.S. court judgments
obtained by government agencies.48

The House of Representatives itself has echoed these sentiments by
acknowledging that “the vast majority of phishing would likely be
unaffected by government regulation or civil enforcement.”49
¶23
With these three formidable hurdles—finding the perpetrator,
obtaining jurisdiction, and collecting the judgment—what options do we
have to combat the ever increasing phishing problem?

46

“Judgment proof” is defined by Black’s Law Dictionary 439 (abridged 5th ed.
1983), as “[d]escriptive of all persons against whom judgments for money
recoveries are of no effect; e.g., persons who are insolvent, who do not have
sufficient property within the jurisdiction of the court to satisfy the judgment, or
who are protected by statutes which exempt wages and property from
execution.”
47
Rustad, supra note 26, at 67-68.
48
FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, supra note 40.
49
H.R. REP NO. 108-698, at 5.
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II. ANOTHER OPTION – FOCUS ON TECHNOLOGY
A. If not legislation, then what?
¶24
Phishing is a problem that exploits a weakness in the current state
of technology and, in a manner of speaking, “uses it against us.” It makes
sense, then, that an effective solution to this problem should focus on
repairing this weakness.50 One commentator described the technological
weakness in this way:

When the Internet was used mainly to communicate and access
information, the lack of security didn't much matter. Now that it's used
for online transactions and critical information, the absence of security
is truly a big problem. It's as if consumers and businesses that rely on
the Internet have wandered into a dangerous neighborhood of cheats,
pickpockets and thieves, and don't even know it.51
¶25
Now that consumers and businesses are becoming increasingly
aware of the Internet’s “dangerous neighborhood,” what can be done about
it? The House of Representatives has offered this useful suggestion:
“[t]here is no silver bullet to end spyware or phishing but greater consumer
awareness and use of available technological countermeasures clearly hold
the greatest promise for curbing these abusive practices.”52

Congress’s first recommendation is to increase “consumer
awareness.” To be sure, “common sense and a healthy level of suspicion go
a long way toward not becoming a victim of phishing.”53 Nevertheless,
consumer awareness alone is not sufficient to solve the phishing problem.
While it might be convenient to assume that only the gullible or Internet
novices fall victim to phishing scams, the current state of technology and
the phishers’ ability to exploit it is such that even the most jaded and “web
savvy” consumers can fall victim to a phishing scam.54 Consumer
awareness must be coupled with technological improvements.
¶26

50

FSTC Proposal, supra note 3, at 3 (noting that “phishing relies on email,
phone, and web technologies to bring forward its traps. Thus, countermeasures
will necessarily have a fundamental technology basis rooted in the ability to
authenticate emails and web sites.”).
51
House Committee Hearing, supra note 2, at 36 (Testimony of Bill Conner,
Chairman, President and CEO of Entrust, Inc.).
52
H.R. REP NO. 108-698, at 5.
53
Id.
54
For an in-depth look at many of the possible ways that current phishers are
defrauding consumers, see GUNTER OLLMAN, NEXT GENERATION SECURITY
SOFTWARE, LTD., THE PHISHING GUIDE: UNDERSTANDING & PREVENTING
PHISHING ATTACKS (Sep. 2004) available at
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B. The Recommendations
¶27
A number of Internet-industry groups and technology companies
have come out with specific recommendations for changes and
improvements in the current Internet technology that they feel would reduce
or even eliminate the phishing problem. These groups include the APWG,55
the Financial Services Technology Consortium,56 Next Generation Security
Software Ltd.,57 Yahoo! Inc.58 and Microsoft Corporation.59
¶28
Judging from the number of different sources that are making them,
there seems to be no shortage of recommendations for how to make the
Internet and email more secure. The real questions seem to be (1) which
recommendations should be implemented, (2) how should they be done, and
(3) when? It is the lack of a consensus on these details that has prevented us
from already having the recommended upgrades.60 Despite the current
disagreement, the rising tide of phishing scams is prodding the various
groups to work together to implement changes to alleviate the problem.61
¶29
Leading the charge in calling for technology changes to combat
phishing has been the APWG. In December 2003, the group proposed four

http://www.nextgenss.com/papers/NISR-WP-Phishing.pdf (last visited Oct. 19,
2004) [hereinafter NGSS Whitepaper]. See also Leslie Walker, Internet
Snagged In the Hooks Of ‘Phishers,’ THE WASHINGTON POST, Jul. 29, 2004,
E01, available at 2004 WL 82772584 (stating that “Verisign, Inc. reported that
phishing attacks are increasingly sophisticated. Verisign analyzed 490 bogus emails and found most did not contain the misspellings often seen in firstgeneration phishing. . . . Today, even cyber-savvy folks can get stung because
the bogus e-mails and Web sites look so official, down to perfect replicas of,
say, eBay’s logo and the real Bank of America Web site.”); and Deceptive EMail Could Cost Consumers $500 Million, Study Finds, CMP TECHWEB, Sep.
30, 2004, available at 2004 WL 64588196 (stating that “[p]hishing attacks are
hard to detect. . . . In a test of 200,000 E-mail users . . . fewer than 10% were
able to distinguish phishing messages from legitimate E-mail all the time.”).
55
See APWG Whitepaper, supra note 3.
56
See FSTC Proposal, supra note 3.
57
See NGSS Whitepaper, supra note 54.
58
See Thomas Claburn, E-Mail-Authentication Problems Spawn New Apps,
INFORMATIONWEEK, Sept.21, 2004, available at
http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=47900731.
59
See Thomas Claburn, Standards Group Rejects Microsoft’s E-Mail
Authentication Plan, INFORMATIONWEEK, Sept. 14, 2004, available at
http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=47205247.
60
See e.g., id.
61
See e.g., Claburn, supra note 58 (noting that “[d]espite disagreements about
authentication standards, pretty much every commercial enterprise on the
Internet concurs that something needs to be done to address domain spoofing
and phishing.”).
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possible technological solutions aimed at preventing phishing scams.62
These recommendations are:
1. Strong Website Authentication.63
2. Mail Server Authentication.64
3. Digitally Signed Email With Desktop
Verification.65
4. Digitally Signed Email With Gateway
Verification.66
¶30
The first recommendation, strong website authentication, “would
require all users of legitimate e-commerce and e-banking sites to strongly
authenticate themselves to the site using a physical token such as a smart
card.”67 In essence, this means that anyone wanting to bank or make
purchases online from such websites would first need to swipe a card in a
device connected to their computer before being allowed to do so. The
APWG notes that this approach is feasible only “for e-commerce and ebanking applications that do not have a large number of users, and where
the risk of a phisher gaining access to a user’s account are high.”68
¶31
The second recommendation, mail server authentication, would
require all email to pass through a gateway server for source verification.69
The APWG notes that the benefits of this approach include the ease with
which it can be configured and the increased ability for legitimate business
email to be identified.70 Potential drawbacks, however, include the facts
that both sender and recipient gateways are required and that it does not
accommodate e-mail forwarding.71
¶32
The third recommendation, digitally signed email with desktop
verification, would have companies that feel they are vulnerable to phishing
attacks attach a digital signature to all their outbound email. The digital
signature would then be verified for authenticity by the email client used by
the recipient.72 In evaluating the pros and cons of using digital signatures,
the APWG notes that this approach would make it impossible to forge the
62

APWG Whitepaper, supra note 3.
Id. at 5.
64
Id. at 6.
65
Id. at 7.
66
Id. at 8.
67
Id. at 5.
68
APWG Whitepaper, supra note 3, at 6.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 7.
63
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“From:” address without detection.73 However, it would still be possible for
a phisher to obtain a valid digital certificate for a domain that is deceptively
similar to that of a target company (e.g. the phisher could use
“ebay.custservices.com,” which is an entirely different domain from
“ebay.com”).74 Concerning the use of the recipients’ email client to verify
the validity of the digital certificates, the main drawback is that not all email
clients currently support the secure email standard that would be
employed.75
¶33
The fourth recommendation, digitally signed email with gateway
verification, is almost identical to the third recommendation; however,
“[i]nstead of relying on the end user’s email client to verify the signature on
the email, a gateway server at the mail relay level would verify the
signatures before they were even received by the receiver’s email server.”76
While this approach solves the problem of some recipients’ use of email
clients that do not support the digital certificate standard, it does not address
the problem noted above regarding a phisher’s possible use of a deceptively
similar domain name.77
¶34
After providing a detailed and critical discussion of each
recommendation the APWG concludes their analysis with the opinion that
“a combination of signed email with desktop verification, and either
gateway verification or mail server IP verification would solve all aspects of
the phishing problem for both consumers and business users.”78 Whether or
not that prediction would eventually prove accurate, technological changes
of the type recommended by the APWG are generally agreed to be a much
needed step in the right direction to address the rising phishing problem.79

CONCLUSION
Something must be done to stop the increasing flow of phishing
scams on the Internet and technological changes must be at the forefront of
any action taken. While the Anti-Phishing Act of 2005 will likely provide
some additional assistance in the fight against phishing scams—and should,
therefore, be passed into law—its usefulness is limited due to the global
nature of the Internet and the ease with which phishers can hide and avoid
judgments. Technological changes such as those proposed by the APWG
¶35
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therefore offer the most hope of providing a comprehensive and lasting
solution to the phishing epidemic.

